Disrupting deceptive uses of AI by covert influence operations

OpenAI News
Disrupting deceptive uses of AI by covert influence operations

OpenAI is committed to enforcing policies that prevent abuse and to improving transparency around AI-generated content. That is especially true with respect to detecting and disrupting covert influence operations (IO), which attempt to manipulate public opinion or influence political outcomes without revealing the true identity or intentions of the actors behind them.

In the last three months, we have disrupted five covert IO that sought to use our models in support of deceptive activity across the internet. As of May 2024, these campaigns do not appear to have meaningfully increased their audience engagement or reach as a result of our services.

This blog describes the threat actors we disrupted, attacker trends we identified, and important defensive trends - including how designing AI models with safety in mind in many cases prevented the threat actors from generating the content they desired, and how AI tools have made our own investigations more efficient. Alongside this blog, we are publishing a trend analysis that describes the behavior of these malicious actors in detail.

Read the full report⁠(opens in a new window)

Threat actors work across the internet. So do we. By collaborating with industry, civil society, and government we tackle the creation, distribution, and impact of IO content. Our investigations and disruptions were made possible in part because there’s been so much detailed threat reporting over the years by distribution platforms and the open-source community.OpenAI is publishing these findings, as other tech companies do, to promote information sharing and best practices amongst the broader community of stakeholders.

## Disruption of covert influence operations

Over the last three months, our work against IO actors has disrupted covert influence operations that sought to use AI models for a range of tasks, such as generating short comments and longer articles in a range of languages, making up names and bios for social media accounts, conducting open-source research, debugging simple code, and translating and proofreading texts.

Specifically, we disrupted:

The content posted by these various operations focused on a wide range of issues, including Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the conflict in Gaza, the Indian elections, politics in Europe and the United States, and criticisms of the Chinese government by Chinese dissidents and foreign governments.

So far, these operations do not appear to have benefited from meaningfully increased audience engagement or reach as a result of our services. Using Brookings’ Breakout Scale,⁠(opens in a new window) which assesses the impact of covert IO on a scale from 1 (lowest) to 6 (highest), none of the five operations included in our case studies scored higher than a 2 (activity on multiple platforms, but no breakout into authentic communities).

Based on the investigations into influence operations detailed in our report, and the work of the open-source community, we have identified the following trends in how covert influence operations have recently used artificial intelligence models like ours.

While much of the public debate so far has focused on the potential or actual use of AI by attackers, it is important to remember the advantages that AI offers to defenders. Our investigations also benefit from industry sharing and open-source research.

We are committed to developing safe and responsible AI, which involves designing our models with safety in mind and proactively intervening against malicious use. Detecting and disrupting multi-platform abuses such as covert influence operations can be challenging because we do not always know how content generated by our products is distributed. But we are dedicated to finding and mitigating this abuse at scale by harnessing the power of generative AI.

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Originally published on OpenAI News.